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Abstract
This paper examines the extent of banking competition in African subregional mar-
kets. A dynamic version of the Panzar-Rosse model is adopted beside the static model
to assess the overall extent of banking competition in each subregional banking mar-
ket over the period 2002 to 2009. Consistent with other emerging economies, the
results suggest that African banks generally demonstrate monopolistic competitive
behaviour. Although the evidence suggests that the static Panzar-Rosse H-statistic
is downward biased compared to the dynamic version, the competitive nature iden-
tified remains robust to alternative estimators.
JEL classification: G21 L10 L13 D40
Keywords: Market structure, African banking, Competition, Panzar-Rosse model
1. Introduction
African banking sectors have witnessed significant reforms over the last three
decades following long period of underperformance. Recent reforms have led to the
liberalisation of interest rates and credit markets. For instance, interest rate controls,
particularly in Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania, and directed lending in Uganda, have
been replaced with open market operations. Another area of development within
each subregion is the significant privatisation of state-owned banks, predominantly
∗Tel.: +441162525113
Email address: sf147@leicester.ac.uk (Samuel Fosu)
in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia, as a step to minimising ineffi-
ciencies.1 Also, by opening up the banking markets, the growth of foreign banks
in each subregion has been significantly high, especially in East and West African
subregions in recent times.2 Moreover, in response to increased regional integration
and advances in information technology, there has been significant upward trend in
cross-border banking particularly within the East African subregion, allowing cus-
tomers to operate their accounts outside their home country. These developments
have implications for banking sector competition.
Whilst the number of banks has undoubtedly increased across Africa, attempts to
gain financial stability have also fostered recapitalisation programmes in a number of
countries. Hence, African banking sectors remain highly concentrated even though
the trend is generally downward. The downward trend in banking sector concen-
tration may suggest an improvement in competition as, theoretically, banks’ market
power may have been diminishing in line with the structural-conduct-performance
paradigm. However, this may not be the case if market concentration does not
necessarily imply undesirable exercise of market power.
In view of the above, this study seeks to address the following questions: First,
how competitive are African banks after years of banking sector reforms? Second,
to what extent do competitive outcomes differ across subregional banking sectors in
Africa? Finally, how does competition differ across interest-generating activities and
overall banking activities? The answers to these questions are particularly significant
as they help us compare banking sector competitiveness across Africa with other
emerging markets. This should help ascertain the effectiveness and possible impact
of continued reforms on African banking. The outcome may also shed light on the
possible link between competition and concentration inferred from the structural-
conduct performance paradigm.
The study employs the Rosse and Panzar (1977); Panzar and Rosse (1987) model
to assess the degree of competition in African banking sectors at subregional level,
assuming common banking markets.3 The Panzar-Rosse model has been extensively
applied to the study of banking competition, particularly in respect of banking sectors
in advanced countries (e.g., Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Coccorese, 2004; De Bandt and
Davis, 2000; Molyneux et al., 1994, 1996; Nathan and Neave, 1989; Shaffer, 1982;
1See Allen et al. (2011) for detailed review of the African financial system.
2For the purpose of this study Africa is divided into four subregions, namely, Southern Africa,
West Africa, North Africa and East Africa. For a list of countries in each subregion see Table 1.
3This assumption is consistent with the similarities of characteristics and increased regional
integration among the relevant countries.
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Vesala, 1995), with recent interest in emerging markets’ banking sectors (e.g., Al-
Muharrami et al., 2006; Gunalp and Celik, 2006; Mamatzakis et al., 2005; Perera
et al., 2006). However, less attention has been paid to banking competition in Africa.
Selected African countries have often been considered as part of major studies where
their competitive conditions are not highlighted (e.g., Bikker et al., 2009; Claessens
and Laeven, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009). Single country studies have been conducted
by Biekpe (2011) and Simpasa (2011) in respect of Ghanaian and Tanzanian banking
sectors, respectively. A critical assumption of the Panzar-Rosse model, which is often
verified, is that banks are observed under long-run equilibrium. However, Goddard
and Wilson (2009) convincingly highlight the fact that adjustment towards market
equilibrium may be gradual rather than instantaneous, thus requiring a dynamic
approach to the Panzar-Rosse model.
Employing both the static and dynamic versions of the Panzar-Rosse model, the
findings of this paper show that banks in African subregional markets can be charac-
terised as monopolistically competitive. The paper finds H-statistics ranging between
0.312 and 0.810, depending on the choice of estimator and model specification. In
particular, the findings suggest that, with the exception of North Africa, African
banks exhibit higher competition at interest-generating activities compared to total
banking activities. Further, it is found that the degree of competition in African
banking markets is comparable to that existing in other emerging markets. Finally,
the paper finds consistent results for both static and dynamic versions as it does for
both scaled and unscaled versions of the Panzar-Rosse model, even though the static
version is biased downwards, as documented in Goddard and Wilson (2009).
The paper contributes to the extant literature in banking competition in several
ways. First, the paper attempts a broader empirical investigation of African bank-
ing competition. To the author’s knowledge, this has not been previously addressed.
Whilst banking competition has attracted much research interest in several countries
and regions, little has been done to assess the competitive conditions in African bank-
ing markets. Second, the regional or common banking market approach adopted in
this paper provides a useful way to assess the overall effectiveness of the recent wave
of financial sector reforms in Africa. Third, by combining both static and dynamic
estimation methods, the paper is less likely to misidentify the competitive nature
of the African banking markets. In particular, a dynamic two-step system GMM
estimator employed to estimate the dynamic Panzar-Rosse model in this paper is
an improvement, in terms of efficiency, on the difference GMM estimator used in
previous study. The dynamic approach is profoundly important given the dramatic
changing environment within banking markets. Finally, the paper provides a first-
hand evidence in support of Goddard and Wilson (2009) that the static H-statistic
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could be downward biased
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some back-
ground information about African banking sectors. Section 3 outlines the Panzar-
Rosse model and discusses the related literature. Section 4 details the econometric
estimation methods; while Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section
6 summarises the findings and concludes the paper.
2. African banking sectors
The study of banking sector competition has attracted much empirical attention
in recent times in response to the possible link between competition and banking
stability. Whilst a significant amount of studies have been carried out in respect of
developed countries, attention has just recently been drawn to African banking sec-
tors. Recent structural changes across African financial sectors, particularly banking
markets, and increased regional integration, which extends banking markets beyond
geographic boundaries, underscore the need for a broader study of banking sector
competition. In what follows, recent reforms and the response of banking sectors
across Africa are discussed.
African banking sectors are generally well below the standards of developed coun-
tries, notwithstanding recent reforms across the continent. With domestic credit to
the private sector averaging about 32% of GDP, financial intermediation remains rel-
atively low in a number of African countries. This feature of the banking sectors is
coupled with strong government ownership and traditional banking activities. The
unfavourable performance, particularly record high levels of problem loans in the
1980s led to significant financial sector reforms. As discussed in Senbet and Otchere
(2006), financial sector reforms in Africa have been aimed at deregulating the finan-
cial sector, opening it up to foreign entry, liberalising interest rates and exchange
rates, removing credit ceilings, restructuring and privatising banks, and promoting
the capital markets.
Whilst there is still strong government presence in African banking sectors (e.g.,
Algeria and Tunisia), a significant amount of success has been achieved in privatis-
ing banks in a number of countries including Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda,
Rwanda and Zambia (Allen et al., 2011). These reforms have not only led to sig-
nificant growth in the number of banks in many African countries but also to a
noticeable increase in the degree of cross-border banking.4
4Recapitalisation programmes have, however, led to significant decrease in the number of banks
in Nigeria in particular.
4
As noted in Allen et al. (2011), banking sector reforms have led many banks
to increase their capital base. The significant growth in the number of small banks
with relatively less capital base, as a by-product of reforms, attracted recapitalisation
programmes (e.g., Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria) in order to address any possible
threat to financial stability. Over the period under study, the subregional average of
the ratio of equity to total assets is as high as approximately 15% in Southern and
West Africa and 16% in North and East Africa.
Whilst some level of success has been recorded across all the African subregions,
there is still more to be achieved. Saving mobilisation and credit allocation have
generally not improved by as much as expected (see Senbet and Otchere, 2006). The
ratio of loans to total assets is just about 48% on average for the whole African
region. At a subregional level, this ratio is approximately 45% and 46% in Southern
and West African subregions, respectively. Meanwhile, Southern African subregion
boasts of the top largest banks on the African continent (mainly in South Africa),
with generally well-developed and sophisticated banking systems (e.g., South Africa,
Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles and Malawi). There are many countries in this sub-
region with total banking sector assets exceeding US$500 million (e.g., South Africa,
Angola, Mauritius, Namibia and Botswana) compared to West Africa (e.g., Nigeria
and Togo). For example, over the period under study, the average total banking
assets is approximately US$5.6 billion for the Southern African subregion. This
compares favourably to an average of approximately US$667 million for the West
African subregion. In the North and East African subregions, however, the ratio of
loans to total assets are relatively higher; the North African subregion with average
total banking assets of approximately US$2.6 billion commands 55%, whilst the East
African subregion with average total banking assets of US$287 million boasts 50%.
Problem loans and investment in relatively riskless government securities still
remain obstacles in African banking. Over the period under study, the average
impaired loans are 7%, 12%, 18% and 19% of total loans in Southern, North, West
and East African subregions, respectively. This problem is worsened by poor credit
information. The average depth of credit information index is approximately 1 in
the West and East African subregions, 2 for the North African subregion, and 3 for
the Southern African subregion.5 Moreover, the degree of contract enforcement is
very low; the average regulatory quality index in each subregion falls below the world
average. As a result, many banks are compelled to invest disproportionately in liquid
government assets.
5Depth of credit information is an index that measures the quality of credit information. It
ranges between 0 and 6.
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The ratio of liquid assets to total assets is approximately 34% in the Southern,
West and East African subregions, and 26% in North Africa over the same period,
with consequences for private sector credit. Worryingly, the credit to private sector as
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) stands at 16% and 19% respectively
in the West and East African subregions, whilst the Southern and North African
subregions record approximately 55% and 45% respectively. This is unsurprising as
the banking system remains the major constituent of the African financial system;
debt markets are as yet generally under-developed (Allen et al., 2011).
Despite record levels of new entry and foreign penetration, very high levels of
concentration characterise African banking sectors. Over the period under consider-
ation, the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is as high as 2059, whilst the
five-bank concentration ratio stands at 77.29% for the whole African region.6 On
the positive side, concentration assumed a downward trend across all the subregions
over the past few years, as can be seen in Figure 1. The Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex (HHI) shows dramatic and consistent downward trend in all subregional banking
sectors except West Africa, where the trend is moderate. A similar trend is indicated
by five-bank concentration ratios,7 as shown in Figure 2.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
As indicated earlier, banking sector concentration may not necessarily suggest
less competition. As argued by Boone et al. (2005), fierce competition may drive out
of the market the less efficient banks, with a resultant increase in banking market
concentration. Hence, a non-structural measure of competition such as the Panzar-
Rosse model which is based on reduced form revenue equation may be a superior
measure of competition.
3. Panzar and Rosse model and related literature
Measurement of competition can take two approaches: the structural and the
non-structural. The structural approach to measuring competition, which under-
6HHI is measured as the sum of the squared market share of each bank in a given country for
each year. Market shares are measured in percentages. Hence, the HHI has an upper limit of
10,000 where one firm commands 100% market share (i.e., monopoly) and a lower bound of zero
for perfect competition. HHI less than 1000 implies a highly competitive market. For a moderately
concentrated market HHI ranges between 1000 and 1800, whilst a concentrated market has HHI
above 1800.
7The only exception is West Africa where the trend is fairly upwards.
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pins the structural-conduct-performance paradigm, associates market power with
the degree of market concentration. The structural approach, thus, assumes lower
competition in concentrated markets; more competition is associated with less con-
centrated markets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) plays a major role here.
Concentration-based measures of competition have been criticised on the grounds
that concentration could be the outcome of greater efficiency, as proposed by the
efficiency-structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973), or greater competition forcing out
of the market inefficient firms, as noted earlier. The non-structural approach to
measuring competition, on the other hand, infers product market competition from
market behaviour. This latter approach is considered to be superior. Rosse and Pan-
zar (1977); Panzar and Rosse (1987) model is a popular example of the non-structural
approach to measuring competition.
The Panzar-Rosse model is an approach to measuring competition that is based
on a reduced-form revenue equation. From this revenue equation, a measure of
competition, H-statistic, is obtained by summing the elasticities of revenue with
respect to input prices. This model assumes that banks have revenue and cost
functions, respectively given as Ri (yi, n, zi) and Ci (yi, wi, ti) , where Ri and Ci are
respectively the revenue and cost of bank i; yi is the output of bank i; wi is a vector
of input prices for bank i ; n is the number of rival bank; and zi and ti are vectors of
exogenous variables relevant respectively to the revenue and cost functions. Following
a profit maximisation path requires that marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost.
That is,
R
′
i (yi, n, zi) = C
′
i (yi, wi, ti) (1)
where R′i and C
′
i are respectively the marginal revenue and marginal costs of bank
i. Long-run equilibrium in the product market imposes a zero profit constraint:
R∗i (y∗i , n∗, z∗i ) = C∗i (yi, wi, ti) (2)
where the asterisked variables are the equilibrium values of the previously defined
variables in equation (1).
The H-statistic is, then, derived as the sum of factor price elasticities. That is
H =
m∑
k=1
∂R∗i
∂wki
wki
R∗i
(3)
where ∂R
∗
i
∂wki
is the derivative of total revenue with respect to the price of the kth
input.
In the case of pure monopoly the H-statistic is zero or negative (i.e., H ≤ 0),
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implying that an increase in factor prices leads to a fall in revenue. This is particularly
the case since the monopolist operates at the price elastic portion of the demand curve
where an increase in price, in response to an increase in input prices, leads to a more
than proportionate fall in units sold. A value of H-statistic between zero and one
(i.e., 0 <H <1) indicates that banks are in a monopolistic competitive market. Here,
an increase in factor prices increases average and marginal costs. This leads to the
exit of loss-making banks and subsequent increase in revenue. In the extreme case
of perfect competition, with free entry and exit, an increase in factor prices causes
revenue to increase proportionally. Thus, H = 1 implies perfect competition.
The Panzar-Rosse model is theoretically consistent with the Lerner index, L, as
it is shown to generalise to the following:
L = H
H − 1; (4)
Thus, the magnitude of H could be an indication of the level of the monopoly power
(hence, competition) in the product market (see Vesala, 1995).
It must be emphasised that the Panzar-Rosse model relies on the assumption
that banks are observed under long-run equilibrium.8 Long-run equilibrium requires
that (risk-adjusted) returns are not statistically significantly correlated with input
prices (Shaffer, 1982). The application of the model to the banking sector further
assumes that banks can be treated as single-product firms offering intermediation
services (De Bandt and Davis, 2000).
Starting from Shaffer (1982), the Panzar-Rosse model has been extensively ap-
plied to the study of banking competition. Using a sample of US banking data for
the period 1979, Shaffer (1982) identifies a monopolistic competitive banking be-
haviour. Other earlier applications of the model are in respect of Canadian banks
(Nathan and Neave, 1989), European banks (Molyneux et al., 1994; Vesala, 1995)
and Japanese banks (Molyneux et al., 1996). Nathan and Neave (1989) find monop-
olistic competition in the Canadian banking sector for the period 1983 and 1984 but
perfect competition in the period 1982.
For a sample of European countries over the period 1986 to 1989, Molyneux et al.
(1994) find that banks in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK)
behave as though operating under monopolistic competitive conditions whilst those
in Italy are classed as operating under monopoly or conjectural variation short-run
8This assumption is crucial for perfect competition and monopolistic competition conclusions to
be accurate (Panzar and Rosse, 1987).
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oligopoly conditions. Also, Vesala (1995) examines the Finnish banking system over
the period 1985 to 1992. He finds monopolistic competitive conditions for all years
except 1989 and 1990 where the banking conditions are consistent with perfect com-
petition. Finally, Molyneux et al. (1996) find conditions consistent with monopoly
or conjectural variation short-run oligopoly in 1986 and monopolistic competition in
1988 for the Japanese banking sector.
All the above studies employ cross-sectional estimation procedure. In order to
explore both time series and cross-sectional variations, recent applications of the
Panzar-Rosse model employ panel data estimation approach. These include Al-
Muharrami et al. (2006) for the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) banking
system; Bikker and Haaf (2002) for 23 European Union and non-European Union
countries; Coccorese (2004) for the Italian banking system; De Bandt and Davis
(2000) for a sample of French, German, Italian and U. banks; Hondroyiannis et al.
(1999) for the Greek banking system; Mamatzakis et al. (2005) for a sample of South
East European countries; and finally Perera et al. (2006) for South Asian banking
sectors. The results of the above studies are generally consistent with monopolistic
competition with the exception of a few submarkets.9
A recent development in the study of banking competition has been the gradual
shift towards regionally classified common or single markets. The reasons behind
such classification include similarity of banking market features (e.g., Al-Muharrami
et al., 2006; Mamatzakis et al., 2005) and the introduction of a single banking licence
(e.g., Casu and Girardone, 2006). Based on the similarities of characteristics within
South Eastern European countries, Mamatzakis et al. (2005) class these countries’
banking sectors as a single banking market and estimate Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for
the entire region over the period 1998 to 2002. Depending on the choice of dependent
variable, H-statistics of 0.726 and 0.746 are documented.
In a similar fashion, Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) study the Arab Gulf Cooperation
Council’s banking system as a single market over the period 1993 to 2002. They find
H-statistics of 0.24 and 0.47, depending on the choice of estimation method - pooled
or fixed effect - which imply that the entire regional banking market behaved as
though operating in monopolistic competition.10
Moreover, following the introduction of the Single Banking Licence in the Euro-
9E.g.,De Bandt and Davis (2000) find that small banks in France and Germany behave as though
operating under monopoly conditions. Likewise, Bikker and Haaf (2002) find that competition is
relatively less in small banks assumed to be operating in local markets.
10Their preferred estimation method, based on model specification test, is the fixed effect which
gives a H-statistic of 0.47.
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pean Union (EU), Casu and Girardone (2006) apply the Panzar-Rosse model to the
study of 15 major European countries’ banking sectors, assuming a common banking
market. Their results show that, between the period 1997 and 2003, EU banks be-
haved as though operating under monopolistic competition with H-statistics of 0.362
and 0.364 based on the model specification.
A further development worth noting is the proposition by Goddard and Wilson
(2009) in relation to modifying the static model to allow for partial adjustment to-
wards equilibrium. This disequilibrium approach, in their view, is justified because
markets are not always in equilibrium. Hence, failure to take this dynamic adjust-
ment into account may render the Panzar-Rosse model misspecified. Using both
simulated and real data for the banking sectors in the Group Seven (G7) countries,
they find that the static H-statistic is severely biased towards zero when the ad-
justment towards equilibrium is partial rather than instantaneous. Similarly, Bikker
et al. (2009) suggest the H-statistics could be biased when scaled rather than un-
scaled revenue equation is estimated. Scaling revenue by total assets makes the
Panzar-Rosse model a price rather than a revenue equation. They further suggest
that controlling for total assets in the revenue equation also biases the Panzar-Rosse
model since this amounts to holding bank output fixed. In this study, these concerns
are taken into consideration as part of robustness checks.
The present paper takes the view that increased regional integration coupled
with advances in information technology and the banking sector reforms justify the
assumption of single banking markets within African subregions. Besides, the paper
embraces recent development by applying a dynamic approach to the Panzar-Rosse
model.
4. Estimation method and data
Following from equations (1) and (2) and consistent with Bikker and Haaf (2002),
the Panzar-Rosse model is implemented by formulating the marginal cost and marginal
revenue functions, imposing an equilibrium condition, and solving for the equilibrium
output as a function of input prices and exogenous control variables. Assuming a
Cobb-Douglas technology, the marginal cost and revenue functions can be written
as:
MCit = α0 + α1lnOutit +
m∑
k=1
βklnInpk,i,t +
p∑
k=1
γklnXck,i,t (5)
and
MRit = φ0 + φ1lnOutit +
q∑
h=1
ϕhXrh,i,t, (6)
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where MCit and MRit are respectively the marginal costs and marginal revenue of
bank i at time t; lnOutit and lnInpk,i,t are respectively the natural logarithms of
output and factor input k of bank i at time t; and Xck,i,t and Xrh,i,t are respectively
the natural logarithms of exogenous control variables k and h.
Imposing a zero profit constraint in equilibrium yields
lnOutit =
(α0 − φ1 +∑mk=1 βklnInpk,i,t +Xck,i,t − ϕhXrh,i,t)
α1 − φ1 . (7)
Equation (7) translates into the following reduced form revenue empirical model:
lnRevit = α +
J∑
j=1
βjlnWj,i,t +
K∑
k=1
γklnXk,i,t +
N∑
n=1
ξnlnZk,t + εi,t, (8)
where subscripts i and t refer to bank i at time t; Rev is either total revenue or
interest revenue or the ratios of these to total assets; Wj is a three-dimensional vector
of input prices, namely, the unit price of fund(PF), unit price of labour(PL) and the
unit price of capital(PC); Xk is a vector of bank-specific explanatory factors which
may shift the revenue and cost functions; Zk is vector of macroeconomic variables;
and εit is a composite error term including bank-fixed effects:
εi,t = µi + νi,t (9)
where µi is bank-fixed effects and νi,t, by assumption, is independently and identically
distributed component with zero mean and variance σ2v .
Following the extant literature, PF is measured as the ratio of total interest
expenses to total deposits; PL is measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total
asset; and PC is proxied by the ratio of other operating expenses to fixed assets.
Bank-specific explanatory factors popular in the literature include total assets (TA)
to control for size;11 the ratio of equity capital to total assets (EQTA), a proxy of
banks’ leverage; the ratio of loans to total assets (NLTA) to account for credit risk
exposure; the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLPL), which controls for
default risk; and the ratio of other operating income to total assets (OITA).12
The H-statistic is then obtained as the sum of the coefficients of factor prices as
11Total assets are excluded in the models with scaled dependent variable.
12Other operating income is used as additional control variable only when interest income is used
as the dependent variable.
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follows:
H =
3∑
i=1
βi. (10)
Consistent with the extant literature (e.g., Gunalp and Celik, 2006; Molyneux
et al., 1996), a long-run equilibrium test is performed by replacing the dependent
variable in equation (8) with the natural logarithm of return on assets (lnROA) as
shown below:
lnROAit = α +
J∑
j=1
βjlnWj,i,t +
K∑
k=1
γklnXk,i,t +
N∑
n=1
ξnlnZk,t + εi,t. (11)
The sum of the elasticity of returns with respect to input prices, henceforth called
E-statistic, is obtained in a similar fashion as in equation (10).
Equations (8) and (11) are estimated using the panel fixed effect approach to
control for heterogeneity across banks whilst controlling for country level factors
such as GDP growth and inflation.
In view of the criticism raised against the static Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-
statistic, equation (11) is modified to take the suggested dynamics into account.
Specifically, lagged dependent variable is included in the model as follows:
lnRevit = αlnRevi,t−1 +
J∑
j=1
βjlnWj,i,t, +
K∑
k=1
γklnXk,i,t +
N∑
n=1
ξnlnZn,t
+ εit. (12)
In this regard, it is possible to wipe out the unobserved firm specific effect by first
differencing equation (12) as follows:
∆lnRevit = α∆lnRevi,t−1 +
J∑
j=1
βj∆lnWj,i,t +
K∑
k=1
γkln∆Xk,i,t +
N∑
n=1
ξn∆lnZn,t
+ ∆εi,t, (13)
in which case a dynamic H-statistic can then be obtained as:
H =
∑3
i=1 βi
1− α . (14)
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A corresponding equilibrium test model will, then, be as in equation (15):
∆lnROAit = α∆lnROAi,t−1 +
J∑
j=1
βj∆lnWj,i,t +
K∑
k=1
γkln∆Xk,i,t +
N∑
n=1
ξn∆lnZn,t
+ ∆εi,t. (15)
The E-statistic for equilibrium test is again obtained as previously described.
The lagged dependent variables in equations (13) and (15) introduce endogeneity
problem, as, by construction, they are correlated with the differenced error terms. In
order to control for such endogeneity bias, Goddard and Wilson (2009) and Olivero
et al. (2011) use the difference GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991), in which lagged levels of the endogenous variables are used as instruments in
the differenced equation. Thus, under the assumptions that the original error term,
εi,t, is serially uncorrelated and that the explanatory variables, Wi,t,Xi,t and Zn,t, are
weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions apply:
E (yi,t−s∆εi,t) = 0; fors ≥ 2; t = 3, ..., T (16)
E (Xi,t−s∆εi,t) = 0; fors ≥ 2; t = 3, ..., T. (17)
where X represents all the explanatory variables other than the lagged revenue and
returns.
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) show that
lagged levels of independent variables can perform poorly as instruments for the
first-differences of these variables, due possibly to persistence or measurement error.
Hence, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) recommend the
inclusion of the equation in levels to obtain a system of equations; the variables
in levels are, then, instrumented with lagged first difference of the corresponding
variables. This approach increases efficiency compared to the difference GMM. Thus,
the following orthogonality restrictions are further imposed:13
E (∆yi,t−sεi,t) = 0; fors = 1. (18)
13Lagged differences other that the most recent ones are not used because they result in redundant
moment conditions (see Arellano and Bover, 1995).
13
E (∆Xi,t−sεi,t) = 0; fors = 1. (19)
By construct, first order serial correlation is expected in the first differenced
equation. Hence, in order to rule out first order serial correlation in levels, a test of
second order serial correlation in the differenced equation is performed (Roodman,
2009).Next, a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is employed to test the
validity of the over-identification restrictions. As a final step, standard errors are
corrected for small sample bias based on the two-step covariance matrix attributed
to Windmeijer (2005).
In view of the above, the study first estimates the static Panzar-Rosse model
and the corresponding equilibrium test model (equations (8) and (11), respectively)
using the panel fixed effect estimation method. This approach helps to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. Second, the dynamic models (equations (12), (13) and
(15)) are estimated using the dynamic system GMM estimator as robustness checks.
Time dummies are included in all models to control for time-specific effects including
the possibility of linear association between input prices and time (Perera et al.,
2006).
A Wald test is performed after each estimation to ascertain whether the H-
statistics are significantly different from zero and one. Next, a similar test is con-
ducted to verify if the E-statistics are significantly not different from zero - a necessary
condition for long-run equilibrium.
Bank-level data over the period 2003 to 2009 is obtained from the BankScope
database. A few data exclusion criteria were applied. First, all bank observations
with negative values of equity were dropped. Second, a few bank observations with
interest expenses exceeding 100 percent of total deposits were dropped.14 The final
sample contains 845 observations of Southern African banks, 832 observations of
West African banks, 484 observations of North African banks and 603 observations
of East African banks. Full country-year observations and subregional totals are
given in Table 1. Macroeconomic variables are sourced from World Bank (2011)
World Development Indicators.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
14The subsequent results, however, do not significantly change when these exclusion criteria are
relaxed.
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5. Results
This section presents the estimations results of the static and dynamic Panzar-
Rosse models for all the subregions. From these estimation results, the static and
dynamic H-statistics and their corresponding E-statistics are computed. Alternative
dependent variables (total revenue and interest revenue) are employed as robustness
checks and a series of diagnostic tests carried out.
5.1. Static H-statistic
First, the static Panzar-Rosse model is estimated using the panel fixed effect
estimation technique. Columns 1-4 of Table 4 show that the H-statistics are positive
and statistically significant for all subregions. North Africa has the highest H-statistic
(0.534), followed by West Africa (0.509), East Africa (0.437) and Southern Africa
(0.357). The Wald test confirms that the H-statistics are significantly different from
both zero and unity for all subregions. This indicates that the subregional banking
markets are characterised by monopolistic competitive behaviour. Thus, competition
coexists with high levels of banking market concentration, suggesting contestable
market behaviour.
[Table 4 about here.]
Following Vesala (1995), the H-statistic can be employed as a continuous measure
of competition. In this regard, banking sector competition in Africa in recent times
is somehow comparable to that existing in other single banking markets in emerging
economies. However, a fair amount of caution is recommended due to cross-market
differences not captured by the model. With the exception of Southern Africa, the H-
statistic is higher for all subregions compared to those documented in Al-Muharrami
et al. (2006) for the GCC banking system (see Section 3). However, for all subregions,
the H-statistic is significantly lower than that documented in Mamatzakis et al.
(2005) for South Eastern European countries. The findings reported here are not
directly comparable to Casu and Girardone (2006) due to significant differences in
model specification.15
Given that most of the studies on banking competition (cited above) report results
consistent with monopolistic competition, the findings of this study suggests that
15Although the H-statistics reported here are larger than those reported in Casu and Girardone
(2006) for 15 major European countries’ banking market, their control variables somehow differ
from those used in this paper.
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recent financial sector reforms in Africa may have had some beneficial effects in
terms of market discipline.
In line with previous studies (e.g., Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Coccorese, 2004;
Molyneux et al., 1994; Yeyati and Micco, 2007), the coefficient of unit price of funds
is positive and statistically significant as expected for all subregions. Likewise, the
unit price of labour is positive and statistically significant for all subregions except
North Africa. Also, the unit price of capital (other operating expenses) is positive
and statistically significant for all subregions. Price of funds seems to be the biggest
contributor to the H-statistic for all subregions except Southern Africa, where the
biggest contributor is the price of labour. This highlights the strong effect of interest
rate liberalisation.
In relation to the control variables, it is observed that bank size (proxied by
total assets) is positive and statistically significant for all subregions, suggesting the
existence of economies of scale. The ratio of equity to total assets is mostly positive
(the exception is East Africa) but significant only for Southern Africa. Consistent
with Mamatzakis et al. (2005) and Bikker and Haaf (2002), the ratio of loans to
total assets is always positive as expected and significant for all subregions except
for North Africa. Also, in line with Mamatzakis et al. (2005) and Al-Muharrami et al.
(2006), the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets is positive for all subregions
and statistically significant except for North Africa. This is consistent with the view
that higher default risk is matched with higher reward (e.g., Al-Muharrami et al.,
2006).
As regards macroeconomic environment, the impact of GDP growth is mixed: it
is negative for Southern and North African subregions but positive for West and East
Africa. However, it is statistically significant only for the North African subregion.
The coefficient of inflation is positive as in Mamatzakis et al. (2005), and significant
only for the Southern and East African subregions.
As the validity of the H-statistics depends on the assumption of long-run equi-
librium, Table 4 also provides the results of the equilibrium test in columns 4-8,
obtained from equation (11) where ROA is the dependent variable. The Wald tests
results show that the E-statistics are not statistically different from zero, suggesting
that the banks are observed under long long-run equilibrium.
The results presented above are subjected to a series of robustness checks. First,
given that a significant number of studies do scale revenue by total assets (e.g.,
Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Hondroyiannis et al., 1999;
Mamatzakis et al., 2005; Perera et al., 2006), whilst several others do not (e.g., Bikker
and Haaf, 2002; Coccorese, 2004; Gunalp and Celik, 2006); and the concerns raised
in Bikker et al. (2009) about possible bias arising from misspecification of the model,
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the paper compares the results above with the models using the ratio of revenue to
total assets as the dependent variables. The results are presented in Table 5
[Table 5 about here.]
AS noted in Table 5, the main findings are qualitatively similar to those presented
earlier, notwithstanding some apparent slight differences in the magnitude of the H-
statistics; The H-statistics are all statistically significantly different from both zero
and unity. In addition, similar results are obtained when total assets are dropped
from the above estimations.16 The existence of long-run equilibrium is also not
rejected, as indicated in columns 4-8 of the table.
As interest-generating activities have been the tradition in African banking sec-
tors for many years, results for interest income as a dependent variable are also
provided in Table 6. The results show that the H-statistic is highest (0.638) for the
West African subregional banking market, followed by North Africa (0.514), South-
ern Africa (0.490) and East Africa (0.444). Thus, the East African banking market is
the least competitive in terms of interest income, while the Southern African bank-
ing market is the least competitive in terms of total banking activity. In comparison
with Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) the estimates of the level of banking market com-
petition are found to be higher for all African subregions, but lower when compared
with Mamatzakis et al. (2005). Columns 4-8 of the table confirm that the banks are
observed under long-run.
[Table 6 about here.]
As for input prices, unit prices of funds and labour are positive and significant for
all subregions. However, the unit price of capital, though positive for all subregions,
is significant only in the case of West Africa. Also, the coefficient of the unit price of
funds is significantly higher in magnitude compared to the results for the total rev-
enue equation and remains the biggest contributor to the H-statistic. This, coupled
with the fact that the H-statistic is higher for all subregions except North Africa,
suggests a higher degree of competition in interest-generating activities relative to
total banking activities.
16These estimations control for capacity indicators such as total fixed assets or equity (e.g.,
De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Gischer and Stiele, 2009; Murjan and Ruza, 2002; Yildirim and Philip-
patos, 2007; Vesala, 1995). Controlling for fixed assets rather than total assets does not make bank
output held fixed, and it is therefore appropriate. The results are not presented here, for brevity,
and are available upon request.
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As far as the control variables are concerned, Table 6 shows that the ratio of equity
to total assets, though always positive, is statistically insignificant for all subregions.
Also, the coefficients of the ratio of loans to total assets are relatively higher in
magnitude compared to the previous results. The ratio of other income to total
assets has the expected negative sign for all subregions but is statistically significant
only for Southern and West African banking markets. Thus, the engagement in other
income-generating activities constrains banks’ ability to generate interest income
(Bikker and Haaf, 2002). The sign of the coefficient of GDP growth is again mixed
but insignificant for all subregions, whilst inflation is positive and significant only for
Southern Africa.
The E-statistics reported again in columns 4-8 of Table 6 do not reject long-run
equilibrium. As shown by the Wald test, the E-statistics are all not statistically
different from zero.
The results presented so far suggest that banking competition in Africa is gen-
erally comparable to regional markets in other emerging economies. As in the total
revenue model, the findings are robust to using the ratio of interest revenue to total
assets as the dependent variable. Furthermore, the findings are robust to dropping
total assets from the model.
5.2. Dynamic H-statistic
In this section, the dynamic versions of the results presented above are discussed.
The estimation results for the models using total revenue as the dependent variable
are shown in Table 7. The maximum lag dependent variable is restricted to one in
all models in order to restrain the number of moment conditions. The lag dependent
variable is positive and significant; the Hansen test p-values are all well above 0.1,
justifying the validity of the over-identification restriction; and, finally, the absence
of second-order serial correlation is not rejected. Thus, the diagnostic tests justify
the use of a dynamic model.
[Table 7 about here.]
Table 7 shows that the H-statistic is positive and significantly different from both
zero and one for all subregions, suggesting monopolistic competitive market structure
in all the banking markets. It is worth noting that the H-statistics are much larger in
magnitude compared to the results in Table 4. This finding lends support to the view
of Goddard and Wilson (2009) that the static H-statistic is downward biased if the
adjustment towards equilibrium is partial rather than instantaneous. The results
further show that, when dynamics are taken into account, H-statistic is highest
(0.605) in East Africa; and it is least (0.517) in Southern Africa. The result for East
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Africa is not surprising given the extent of recent reforms and cross-border banking.
Even after taking partial adjustment to equilibrium into account, the H-statistics
for all subregions are slightly lower than those reported in Mamatzakis et al. (2005),
except when interest revenue is considered.
Consistent with previous results (Table 4), the price of funds is positive and
significant for all subregions. Similarly, the price of labour is positive and significant
for all subregions, whilst the price of capital is significantly positive for only the
North and East African subregional banking markets. As in previous results, the
price of funds seems to be the biggest contributor to the H-statistic.
As far as the control variables are concerned, the noticeable changes are that the
ratio of net loans to total assets is now significant only for East Africa. GDP growth
is positive and significant only for East Africa and inflation is significantly positive
only for Southern Africa. The ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets is now not
significant for West Africa
The results of the equilibrium test (equation (13)) are also presented in Table 7
(columns 4-8). The diagnostic tests are satisfactory, and long-run equilibrium is not
rejected.17
As in the estimation of the static models, the robustness of these results is as-
sessed. First, similar results are obtained when total revenue is replaced with the
ratio of total revenue to total assets as the dependent variable, as shown in Table
8. Compared to the preceding results, the H-statistics are slightly larger. Also, the
H-statistics for West Africa is significantly different from one only at the margin.
These notwithstanding, the main findings remain unchanged.
[Table 8 about here.]
Finally, results of the dynamic models in which interest revenue is the dependent
variable are also provided in Table 9. The results are not qualitatively different from
the above except that the West and East African subregional banking markets now
have higher H-statistics compared with the findings of Mamatzakis et al. (2005). All
the diagnostic tests are, again, satisfactory. The H-statistics are, again, higher in
magnitude compared to those shown in Table 6. Consistent with the results in Table
6, the H-statistic is highest in West Africa (0.810). However, East Africa also has a
high H-statistic of 0.780.
[Table 9 about here.]
17The lagged dependent variable for the equilibrium test model is, however, not significant for
North Africa. Thus, a fair amount of caution is to be exercised in interpreting the results.
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6. Conclusion
This study examines banking competition across subregional banking markets in
Africa. Assuming common markets within each subregion due to increased regional
integration and cross-border banking, the non-structural approach to measuring com-
petition proposed by Rosse and Panzar (1977); Panzar and Rosse (1987) is used to
estimate elasticities of revenue with respect to input prices, the sum of which gives
an indication of the nature of competition in each subregion. The results suggest
the existence of monopolistic competition across African subregional banking mar-
kets. These results are consistent with several recent studies for other parts of the
world, particularly in emerging economies, suggesting that recent structural reforms
within Africa may have had significant effects as far as banking sector competition
is concerned.
It must be emphasised that the results are robust to alternative views of banking
activities (i.e., interest-generating activities versus total banking activities) as well
as alternative specifications and estimators. In particular, whilst the existence of
long-run equilibrium, a necessary condition, is verified for all model specifications,
the robustness of the results in relation to the possibility of partial adjustment to-
wards equilibrium is further assessed. In the empirical implementation, therefore,
a dynamic approach is also used to estimate the Panzar-Rosse model to obtain a
dynamic H-statistic for comparison with the static H-statistic. Whilst the results
confirm the downwards bias of the static H-statistic, monopolistic competition can-
not be ruled out.
The results offer policy significance due to the possible link between banking
competition and efficient financial intermediation, bank profitability and stability.
The results also offer a yardstick against which to measure the success of several
years of regional integration and cross-border banking in Africa.
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Figure 1
Evolution of banking sector concentration (HHI) by subregion.
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Figure 2
Evolution of banking sector concentration (CR5) by subregion.
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Table 1
Sample number of banks by country, year and subregion
Year
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Panel 1: Southern Africa
Angola 5 9 10 11 13 12 13 12 85
Botswana 1 4 6 7 9 9 11 10 57
Congo, D.R. OF 1 3 5 9 9 7 9 6 49
Lesotho 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 21
Madagascar 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 37
Malawi 7 10 10 9 9 8 11 11 75
Mauritius 2 11 13 13 14 15 16 12 96
Mozambique 2 4 4 6 6 9 11 11 53
Namibia 1 1 2 7 8 7 8 7 41
Seychelles 0 1 2 4 4 4 3 2 20
South Africa 2 3 11 25 30 34 41 37 183
Swaziland 2 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 39
Zambia 5 12 12 12 12 14 12 10 89
Regional total 33 71 89 116 127 131 148 130 845
Panel 2: West Africa
Benin 4 6 4 6 6 6 6 5 43
Burkina Faso 3 5 7 7 8 7 6 5 48
Cameroon 5 9 10 11 12 9 6 5 67
Cape Verde 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 16
Gabon 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 13
Gambia 2 3 3 4 5 4 4 3 28
Ghana 4 4 5 9 9 21 23 22 97
Ivory Coast 8 11 11 13 12 11 10 6 82
Mali 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 6 49
Mauritania 5 7 7 8 6 5 4 5 47
Nigeria 22 28 36 26 22 23 19 17 193
Senegal 9 10 10 8 8 8 7 7 67
Sierra Leone 4 5 6 5 8 8 8 7 51
Togo 1 3 4 4 5 5 5 4 31
Regional total 75 99 112 112 112 118 109 95 832
Panel 3: North Africa
Algeria 8 9 14 12 15 15 15 12 100
Morocco 3 5 7 7 10 17 17 15 81
Niger 1 3 4 4 5 5 4 4 30
Sudan 8 10 7 9 13 17 18 17 99
Tunisia 10 19 20 21 25 27 29 23 174
Regional total 30 46 52 53 68 81 83 71 484
Panel 4: East Africa
Burundi 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 34
Ethiopia 1 8 8 9 9 10 8 9 62
Kenya 12 26 27 30 30 35 35 34 229
Rwanda 1 3 4 4 5 4 3 3 27
Tanzania 1 2 7 21 25 24 23 22 125
Uganda 9 15 16 16 17 16 18 19 126
Regional Regional total 29 59 67 85 90 93 90 90 603
Source: Fitch-IBCA’s Bankscope database and own calculation
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
Variables ln TR ln IR ln ROA lnPF ln PL ln PC ln TA ln NLTA ln EQTA ln LLPL ln GDPG ln INFL
Panel 1: Southern Africa
ln TRr 1.000
ln IR 0.978 1.000
ln ROA 0.033 −0.012 1.000
ln PF 0.206 0.241 0.116 1.000
ln PL −0.155 −0.216 0.215 0.133 1.000
l PC 0.105 0.068 0.046 0.126 −0.036 1.000
ln TA 0.967 0.965 −0.053 0.152 −0.345 0.109 1.000
ln NLTA 0.317 0.381 −0.033 0.344 −0.089 −0.015 0.279 1.000
ln EQTA −0.243 −0.279 0.389 0.190 0.323 −0.044 −0.322 −0.015 1.000
ln LLPL −0.092 −0.133 0.069 −0.193 0.331 −0.079 −0.188 −0.361 0.170 1.000
ln GDPG −0.015 −0.031 0.001 −0.234 0.085 −0.096 −0.037 −0.134 −0.040 0.176 1.000
ln INFL −0.184 −0.203 0.122 −0.262 0.147 −0.154 −0.237 −0.303 0.050 0.433 0.192 1.000
Panel 2: West Africa
ln TR 1.000
ln IR 0.959 1.000
ln ROA 0.056 0.053 1.000
ln PF 0.034 0.116 0.145 1.000
ln PL −0.211 −0.218 0.104 0.245 1.000
ln PC −0.088 −0.020 0.072 0.189 0.035 1.000
ln TA 0.966 0.927 −0.047 −0.098 −0.382 −0.086 1.000
ln NLTA 0.162 0.147 −0.183 −0.148 −0.138 −0.031 0.238 1.000
ln EQTAa −0.117 −0.086 0.222 0.246 0.316 0.040 −0.241 −0.218 1.000
ln LLPL −0.086 −0.059 −0.086 0.212 0.137 −0.081 −0.133 −0.316 0.066 1.000
ln GSPG 0.036 0.072 0.177 0.153 0.062 −0.005 −0.014 −0.207 0.156 0.183 1.000
ln INFL 0.124 0.162 0.192 0.410 0.212 0.182 0.043 −0.310 0.230 0.176 0.374 1.000
Panel 3: North Africa
ln TR 1.000
ln IR 0.980 1.000
ln ROAa −0.208 −0.231 1.000
ln PF −0.097 −0.003 −0.033 1.000
ln PL −0.281 −0.343 0.244 −0.040 1.000
ln PC −0.236 −0.244 0.187 −0.042 0.345 1.000
ln TA 0.975 0.957 −0.281 −0.138 −0.397 −0.312 1.000
ln NLTA 0.128 0.193 −0.058 0.404 0.066 0.039 0.133 1.000
ln EQTA −0.365 −0.367 0.521 0.078 0.247 0.091 −0.430 −0.097 1.000
ln LLPL −0.102 −0.135 −0.169 −0.066 −0.039 −0.085 −0.116 −0.262 0.011 1.000
ln GDPG 0.013 −0.009 0.018 0.119 0.153 −0.018 −0.036 −0.083 0.003 −0.049 1.000
ln INFL −0.046 −0.114 0.130 0.019 0.122 −0.061 −0.065 −0.227 0.144 0.031 0.331 1.000
Panel 4: East Africa
ln TR 1.000
ln IR 0.988 1.000
ln ROA 0.208 0.214 1.000
ln PF −0.324 −0.276 −0.042 1.000
ln PL −0.163 −0.143 −0.073 0.282 1.000
ln PC −0.061 −0.021 0.051 −0.026 0.120 1.000
ln TA 0.960 0.940 0.140 −0.402 −0.406 −0.137 1.000
ln NLTA −0.017 0.007 −0.092 0.329 0.147 −0.106 −0.075 1.000
ln EQTA −0.409 −0.390 0.131 0.389 0.249 −0.084 −0.432 0.201 1.000
ln LLPL −0.147 −0.179 −0.249 0.081 0.221 0.000 −0.234 0.013 0.057 1.000
ln GDPG 0.051 0.046 0.167 −0.163 −0.167 0.182 0.053 −0.101 −0.175 −0.171 1.000
ln INFL 0.209 0.186 −0.050 −0.060 −0.081 −0.212 0.262 0.096 0.046 −0.113 −0.036 1.000
TA: total assets, TR: total revenue, IR: interest revenue, ROA: return on assets, PF: price of funds, PL: price
of labour, PC: price of capital, NLTA: the ratio of net loans to total assets, EQTA: The ratio of equity to total
assets, LLPL: the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, GDPG: GDP growth rate, INFL: inflation.
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